Understanding African relationships: The case of eritrean Ethiopian border dispute by Uchehara, Kieran E.
63
Understanding African Relationships: The Case of Eritrean-
Ethiopian Border Dispute 
Kieran E. Uchehara1 
Abstract 
Boundary disputes are among the most explosive international flashpoints. They 
frequently correlate with militarised interstate disputes and are more likely to lead to 
high-intensity conflict compared to other forms of friction. The Eritrea-Ethiopia peace 
process remains stalled a decade after the arbitral award by the Boundary Commission 
and several years after awards by the Commission. To this end, I analyse primary and 
secondary sources and assesse why arbitration by the commissions did not produce the 
desired outcome. This paper examines the Eritrean-Ethiopian border dispute from 1998 
to the present and explains the case while searching for solutions. In detail, the analysis 
first sheds light on the dispute as well as previous attempts at settlement. Second, a new 
theoretical approach is introduced in the form of conflict resolution theory. Finally, an 
analysis of the peace process in light of this theoretical tool is used to offer a prognosis 
of the future.  
Keywords: Eritrean, Ethiopian, Border Dispute, Attempted Settlements, Boundary 
Commission  
Introduction 
Boundaries are natural or artificial separations or divisions between adjoining properties 
that show their limits. They are used to establish private and public ownership by 
determining the exact location of the points, at which one piece of land is 
distinguishable from another. They are also used to mark the functional and 
jurisdictional limits of political subdivisions. The setting of boundaries is a 
characteristic of the modern era in history, during which centralized states started to 
emerge–those that required both protection against attacks and definition of their 
populations. Historically, natural objects such as rivers and mountains served this 
purpose. However, accurate determination of boundaries requires careful surveying and 
cartography, which were not widely used until the early nineteenth century. Still, even 
in the late twentieth century, with the established technical methods available, 
mapmakers were occasionally forced to turn to ancient landmarks and memories when 
attempting to set boundaries. 
Generally, a dispute over territorial boundary is a disagreement concerning the 
possession/control of land between two or more territorial entities or upon the 
possession/ control of land by a new state, and assuming power after it has conquered 
the land from a former state no longer recognized by the new one. Naturally, a dispute 
can go so far as to the possession of natural resources such as rivers, fertile farmland, 
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mineral or oil resources although it can also be driven by culture, religion and ethnic 
nationalism. It often results from vague and unclear language in a treaty that set up the 
original boundary. It is also a major cause of wars and terrorism as states often try to 
assert their sovereignty over a territory through invasion, and non-state entities try to 
influence the actions of politicians through terrorism (Sumner, 2004, pp. 1779-1812; 
Highet, 1993, pp. 87-91; St. John, 1998-99, pp. 79-85; Thomas,  1997, pp. 69-71).  
In the case of Eritrea and Ethiopia, these explanations appear to stand valid. Africa has 
been experiencing a great number of conflicts in the past decades, and two areas of the 
continent have stood out in particular: southern Africa and northeast Africa. The reasons 
have not lain in the particular character of conflict within the states, and factors behind 
domestic conflict have been somewhat similar across the continent. Yet, these two 
regions have been at the forefront of linking domestic conflict with tensions among the 
states within the regions and coupled with the involvement of outside international 
actors. In this context, the countries most affected, and which will be the main focus of 
this paper, are Ethiopia and Eritrea dating back to 1993 (WoodWard, 2003). 
The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the evolution of the boundary dispute 
between these two nations. Specifically, attempt is made to understand why these sister 
states often engage in boundary disputes and, hence, undermine the economic, social 
and political conditions in their respective countries. This paper contributes to the 
existing literature by explaining when, how and why natural or artificial separations or 
divisions should always be a subject of contention among African states. To properly 
reflect the border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the present work focuses on tthe 
period between 1998 and 2008.  
Eritrea and Ethiopia are selected as a case study for two reasons: First, both nations are 
ranked among the world’s poorest countries with multidimensional poverty index (The 
African Economist, 2013; Watson, 2013). Both governments continue diverting their 
main financial resources to their military instead of wide-scale economic development 
or investment plans. Also, the economic future of both depends on their ability to 
master social problems such as illiteracy, health care, unemployment, low skills and, 
more importantly, on the governments’ own willingness to support a true market 
economy. Second, the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia has frequently spill-or 
threatens to spill-over borders, endangering or destabilizing entire regions in the form of 
massive and forced migration and refugee movements into the nearby neighbor states. 
The paper relies on the content analysis of secondary data sourced from textbooks, 
journals, press materials, newspapers, and government and non-government reports. 
These textual sources are cross-validated and triangulated with empirical works on 
Ethiopia and Eritrea border dispute. The secondary sources used in this paper are 
significant in several ways. The analysis that Ethiopia and Eritrea are ranked among the 
world’s poorest countries with multidimensional poverty index reflects a visible 
dimension of the phenomenon and clearly represents the impact of such disputes. 
Following this introduction, this paper starts with an attempt to conceptualize and 
evaluate the definition of boundaries, which is then followed by a working definition 
and understanding of border dispute. The core of this paper is historically anchored and 
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delivered through an attempt to examine when and how Eritrea and Ethiopia border 
disputes developed. This is followed by a concluding section that provides prospective 
recommendations on how to advance a lasting solution to Ethiopia and Eritrea border 
conflict. 
Conceptual Framework 
Borders create a clear difference; their existence enables us to maintain some sort of 
order, both within the spaces and groups which are thus encompassed, as well as 
between ‘our’ compartment and that of the ‘other’ groups and spaces which are part of a 
broader system of global ordering (Albert, Jacobson, and Lapid, 2001, pp. 225-247; 
Henke, & Strüver, 2002, pp. 141-146). Territorial borders performed this function under 
the Westphalian state system, where the principle of Uti Possidetis ensured the 
maintenance of inter-state order through the mutual recognition/acceptance of territorial 
integrity and, hence, the notion of territorial sovereignty (Castellino, & Allen, 2003, pp. 
20-25; 282). The process of territorial ordering was imposed upon the political 
landscape during the era of decolonization. Thus the bordering process creates order 
through the construction of difference, whereby ‘others’ are expected to respect the 
rights of the self, if only because they desire their own rights to be respected in the same 
way, or because the nature of power relations is such that they have no alternative. The 
Groucho Marx notion of borders, namely that we do not desire to belong to groups 
which don’t want us as members in the first place, is the exception rather than the rule. 
Most of us aspire to cross borders into the forbidden, and often invisible, spaces on the 
other side of the wall, although at one and the same time we do not want the ‘others’ to 
cross the boundaries into our own recognizable and familiar world. Difference is okay if 
we determine the rules of belonging; it is unacceptable if it is determined by someone 
else. 
According to Ducan, by creating ‘otherness’, we create separate identities through the 
maintenance of the border. The location of the boundary may change through time, as 
some groups or territories expand and others decline, but they will always demarcate the 
parameters within which identities are conceived, perceived, perpetuated and reshaped 
(Ducan, 1993, pp. 39-56).  
Whatever the form of reterritorialization which takes place, territory remains an 
important dimension of identity (Forsberg, 1996, pp. 355-386; Kaplan, 1999, pp. 31-
49). The loss of sovereignty does not mean the loss of territoriality—regionalization at 
both the pan-state and intrastate levels takes on new forms of territorial organization of 
power and, by association, new forms and contours of the borders encompassing these 
spaces (Agnew, 1994, 53-80; Brenner, 1999, pp. 431-451). Territorial restructuring is 
constantly taking place as new power containers take the place of the state. Space and, 
by association, borders undergo constant reification (Kemp, 2000, pp. 315-344; 
Forsberg, 2003, pp. 7-24). Neither should we forget that the hard territorial lines of 
inter-state boundaries still engender a great deal of conflict, although much of this 
conflict is focused as much on issues of identity and historical construction of 
‘homeland’ spaces, as it is on positional and resource disputes (Dzurek, 1999, pp. 83-
89; Abbink,  2003, pp. 219–231).  
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Eritrea lies along the Red Sea in the northernmost area of the region known as the Horn 
of Africa. Ethiopia, however, is landlocked and has no direct access to any sea ports. As 
neighbors, they share some of the oldest archaeological discoveries in the world. These 
discoveries lie in the region of Tigray, now a province of Ethiopia, and historically a 
territory in both Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
Chronology of the Conflict 
After a series of armed incidents, in which several Eritrean officials were killed near 
Badme, on 6 May 1998 a large Eritrean mechanized force entered the Badme region 
along the border of Eritrea and Ethiopia’s northern Tigray Region, resulting in a 
firefight between the Eritrean soldiers and the Tigrayan militia and security police they 
encountered (Connell, 2004). The Claims Commission found that this was in essence an 
affirmation of the existence of a state of war between belligerents, not a declaration of 
war, and that Ethiopia also notified the United Nations Security Council, as required 
under Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter (The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary 
Commission, 2003).  
The fighting immediately escalated to exchanges of artillery and tank fire, leading to 
four weeks of intense fighting. Ground troops fought on three fronts. On 5 June 1998, 
the Ethiopians launched air attacks on the airport in Asmara,  and the Eritreans 
retaliated by attacking the airport of Mekele. These raids caused civilian casualties and 
deaths on both sides of the border (Banks, Muller, and Overstreet, 2005, p. 366; Shinn, 
2004, pp. 387-8; Tareke, 2009, p. 345). The United Nations Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1177 condemning the use of force and welcomed statements from both sides 
to end the air strikes. 
Then, there was a lull as both sides mobilized huge forces along their common border 
(Biles, 2000). Both countries spent several hundred million dollars on new military 
equipment (Winfield, 2000a). This was despite the peace mediation efforts by the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United States/Rwanda peace plan, the 
latter proposing a four-point peace plan that called for the withdrawal of both forces to 
pre-June 1998 positions. Eritrea refused and, instead, demanded the demilitarization of 
all disputed areas along the common border, to be overseen by a neutral monitoring 
force and direct talks (IRIN, 2007; Human Rights Watch World Report, 1999).  
With Eritrea’s refusal to accept the United States/Rwanda peace plan, on 22 February 
1999 Ethiopia launched a massive military offensive to recapture Badme. There was 
tension on 6 February 1999, when Ethiopia claimed that Eritrea had violated the 
moratorium on air raids by bombing Adigrat - a claim it later withdrew (BBCNEWS, 
2000). 
Following the first five days of heavy fighting at Badme, by which time Ethiopia had 
broken through Eritrea’s fortified front and was 10 kilometers (six miles) deep into 
Eritrean territory, Eritrea accepted the OAU peace plan on 27 February 1999 
(BBCNEWS, 1999; CNN, 2007). While both states said that they accepted the OAU 
peace plan, Ethiopia did not immediately stop its advance because it demanded that 
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peace talks be contingent on an Eritrean withdrawal from the territory occupied since 
the first outbreak of fighting (Staff World, 1999).  
On May 16, the BBC reported that after a lull of two weeks the Ethiopians had attacked 
at Velessa on the Tsorona front-line, south of Eritrea’s capital Asmara (Staff World, 
1999). In June 1999 the fighting continued with both sides in entrenched positions 
(Laeke, 1999). “Proximity talks” broke down in early May 2000 “with Ethiopia 
accusing Eritrea of imposing unacceptable conditions” (Pearce, 2000). On 12 May 
2000, the Ethiopians launched an offensive that broke through the Eritrean lines 
between Shambuko and Mendefera, crossed the Mareb River, and cut the road between 
Barentu and Mendefera, the main supply line for the Eritreans on the western front of 
the fighting (Lortan, 2000, pp. 1-2; Xan, 2012). 
The Ethiopian sources state that on 16 May 2000, Ethiopian aircraft all returned to their 
bases after attacking targets between Areza and Maidema, and between Barentu and 
Omohager, while heavy ground fighting continued in the Das and Barentu area and in 
Maidema. The next day Ethiopian ground forces with air support captured Das. Eritrean 
forces evacuated Barentu and fighting continued in Maidema (Xan, 2012). Also on 17 
May 2000, due to the continuing hostilities, the United Nations Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1298 and imposed an arms embargo on both countries (BBC World 
Service, 1999).  
By 23 May 2000, Ethiopia claimed that its ‘troops had seized vital command posts in 
the heavily defended Zalambessa area, about 100km (60 miles) south of the Eritrean 
capital, Asmara’ (Lortan, 2000, pp. 1-2). However,  the Eritreans claimed they withdrew 
from the disputed border town of Zalambessa and other disputed areas on the central 
front as a ‘...goodwill’ gesture to revive peace talks’ while Ethiopia claimed it was a 
‘tactical retreat’ to take away one of Ethiopia’s last remaining excuses for continuing 
the war; a report from Chatham House observes, ‘the scale of Eritrean defeat was 
apparent when Eritrea unexpectedly accepted the OAU peace framework’ (Last, 2000; 
Plaut, and Gilkes, 1999). 
Having recaptured most of the contested territories, and having heard that the Eritrean 
government would withdraw from any other territories it occupied at the start of 
fighting in accordance with a request from the OAU, on 25 May 2000 Ethiopia declared 
the war was over (Inquai, 2000; Tran, 2000). By the end of May 2000, Ethiopia 
occupied about a quarter of Eritrea’s territory, displaced 650,000 people and destroyed 
the key components of Eritrea’s infrastructure (CNN, 2000). 
The Eritrean defences were eventually overtaken by a surprise Ethiopian pincer 
movement on the Western front of the territory between the two nations, which resulted 
in the capture of Barentu and an Eritrean retreat. The element of surprise in the attack 
involved the use of tanks coming in to secure the area (CNN, 2000).  
Regional Destabilisation 
The fighting also spread to Somalia as both governments tried to outflank one another. 
The Eritrean government began supporting the Oromo Liberation Front, a rebel group 
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seeking the independence of Oromia from Ethiopia in part based in Somalia and 
controlled by Mohamed Farrah Aidid64 (Staff World, 2001; Gilkes, 1999a). Ethiopia 
retaliated by supporting groups in southern Somalia who were opposed to Aidid, and by 
renewing relations with the Islamic regime in Sudan—which was accused of supporting 
the Eritrean Islamic Salvation, a Sudan based group that had launched attacks in the 
Eritrea–Sudan border region—while also lending support to various Eritrean rebel 
groups including one known as the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (Gilkes, 1999b).  
Casualties, Displacement and Economic Disruption 
Eritrea claimed that 19,000 of their soldiers were killed during the conflict; most reports 
put the total war casualties from both sides as being around 70,000 (Xan, 2012). All 
these figures have been contested and other news reports simply state that ‘tens of 
thousands’ or ‘as many as 100,000’ were killed in the war (Winfield, 2000b).  
The fighting led to massive internal displacement in both countries as civilians fled the 
war zone. Ethiopia expelled 77,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin it 
deemed a security risk, thus compounding Eritrea’s refugee problem (Staff, 2001; A 
Critical Look into the Ethiopian Elections, 2007). The majority of the 77,000 Eritrean 
and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin were considered well-off by the Ethiopian standard of 
living, and were deported after their belongings had been confiscated (Klein, 1999, p. 
11). On the Eritrean side, around 7,500 Ethiopians living in Eritrea were interned, and 
thousands of others were deported. According to Human Rights Watch, detainees on 
both sides were subject in some cases to torture, rape, or other degrading treatment 
(Zenbeworke, 2008).  
The economies of both countries were already weak as a result of decades of continuing 
fighting. As a consequence, the war exacerbated these problems, resulting in food 
shortages. Prior to the war, much of Eritrea’s trade was with Ethiopia, and much of 
Ethiopia’s foreign trade relied on Eritrean roads and ports (Zenbeworke, 2008).   
Aftermath of Cessation of Hostilities 
On 18 June 2000, the parties agreed to a comprehensive draft for peace and binding 
arbitration of their disputes under the Algiers Agreement. A 25-kilometer-wide 
Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) was established within Eritrea, patrolled by the United 
Nations peacekeeping forces from over 60 countries (the United Nations Mission in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Finally, on 12 December 2000, an agreement was 
signed by the two governments (Staff World, 2000).
Continued Tensions 
On 13 April 2002, the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission, established under the 
Algiers Agreement in collaboration with the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The 
Hague, agreed upon a ‘final and binding’ verdict. The ruling awarded some territory to 
each side, but Badme, the flash point of the conflict, was awarded to Eritrea (Abbink, 
2003, pp. 219–231). Both countries vowed to accept the decision wholeheartedly the 
day after the ruling was made official (Astill, 2007). A few months later, though, 
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Ethiopia requested clarifications and later announced that it was deeply dissatisfied with 
the ruling (Bhalla, 2002; BBC, 2002; Plaut, 2003). In September 2003, Eritrea refused 
to agree to a new commission-which had to be agreed to if the old binding agreement 
were to be set aside-and asked the international community to put pressure on Ethiopia 
to accept the ruling. In November 2004, Ethiopia accepted the ruling ‘in principle’ 
(Staff World, 2004).  
On 10 December 2005, Ethiopia announced it was withdrawing some of its forces from 
the Eritrean border ‘in the interests of peace’ (BBC, 2005). Then, on 15 December 
2005, the United Nations also began to withdraw peacekeepers from Eritrea in response 
to the UN resolution passed the previous day (Some UN Staff to Relocate to Ethiopia 
From Eritrea, 2007). On 21 December 2005, a commission at the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in The Hague ruled that Eritrea broke international law when it attacked 
Ethiopia in 1998, thus triggering the broader conflict (Ruling, 2005).  
Ethiopia and Eritrea subsequently remobilized troops along the border, leading to fears 
that the two countries could return to war (UN, 2005; BBC, 2005). On 7 December 
2005, Eritrea banned the UN helicopter flights and ordered Western members 
(particularly from the United States, Canada, Europe and Russia) of the UN 
peacekeeping mission on its border with Ethiopia to leave within 10 days, sparking 
concerns of further conflict with its neighbour (International Herald Tribune, 2005). In 
November 2006, Ethiopia and Eritrea boycotted an Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary 
Commission meeting at The Hague which would have demarcated their disputed border 
using the UN maps. There, Ethiopia did not show because it did not accept physical or 
map demarcations; nor did Eritrea since, although it backed the commission’s 
proposals, it insisted that the border should be physically marked out (Report of the 
Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, 2006).  
Both nations have been accused of supporting dissidents and armed opposition groups 
against each other. John Young, a Canadian analyst and researcher for Integrated 
Regional Information Networks (IRIN), the United Nations Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs news agency, reported that:  
‘the military victory of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF) that ended the Ethiopia–Eritrea War, and its occupation of a 
swath of Eritrean territory, brought yet another change to the configuration of 
armed groups in the borderlands between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Asmara 
replaced Khartoum as the leading supporter of anti-EPRDF armed groups 
operating along the frontier’ (IRIN, 2007).  
However, Ethiopia was also accused of supporting rebels opposed to the Eritrean 
government. At the November 2007 deadline, some analysts feared the restart of the 
border war, but the date passed without any conflict (Heinlein, 2007). Obviously, there 
were many reasons why war did not resume. Former United States Ambassador, David 
Shinn, claimed that both Ethiopia and Eritrea were in a bad position. What’s more, 
many feared the weak Eritrean economy was not improving like those of other African 
nations, while others stated that Ethiopia was bogged down in Mogadishu. Shinn argued 
that Ethiopia had ‘a very powerful and disciplined national army that made pretty short 
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work of the Eritreans in 2000, and that the Eritreans had not forgotten that’ (Shinn, 
2004, pp. 387–8). Though, he added that Ethiopia was not interested in war because 
America would condemn Ethiopia if it initiated the war. In his words: ‘I do not think 
even the United States could sit by and condone an Ethiopian-initiated attack on Eritrea’ 
(Shinn, 2004, pp. 387–8).   
Decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
As stipulated by the Algiers Agreement, the two parties presented their cases at the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration to two different Commissions; one was the Eritrea–
Ethiopia Boundary Commission, which ruled that Badme lies in Eritrea; and the 
Eritrea–Ethiopia claims Commission (Damian, 2003; Abbink, 2003, pp.219-231).  
In July 200,1 the same Commission decided its jurisdiction, procedures and possible 
remedies. The result of this sitting was issued in August 2001 and in October, following 
consultations with the parties, the commission adopted its rules of procedure. 
Subsequently in December, the parties filed their claims with the commission with 
regard to such matters as the conduct of military operations in the front lines, the 
treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) and of civilians and their property, diplomatic 
immunities and the economic impact of certain government actions during the conflict. 
At the end of 2005, final awards were issued on claims on Pensions and Ports; partial 
awards went to claims about POWs, the central fronts, civilian claims, western and 
eastern fronts, and diplomatic, economic and property losses, as well as Jus Ad Bellum 
(Latin for ‘right to war’). By definition, Jus Ad Bellum is a set of criteria that are to be 
consulted before engaging in war, in order to determine whether entering into war is 
permissible; that is, whether it is a just war (Johnson, 1981, p. 4; Luban, 2003, pp. 160-
181). 
Continuing Border Conflicts 
On 19 June 2008, the BBC published a time line of the conflict as follows: 
1. September 2007-War could resume between Ethiopia and Eritrea over their
border conflict, warns the United Nations special envoy to the Horn of 
Africa, Kjell Magne Bondevik. 
2. November 2007-, Eritrea accepted the border line demarcated by the
International Boundary Commission. Ethiopia rejected it. 
3. January 2008-the UN extended the mandate of peacekeepers on the
Ethiopia–Eritrea border for six months. The UN Security Council demanded 
Eritrea to lift fuel restrictions imposed on the UN peacekeepers at the 
Eritrea–Ethiopia border area. Eritrea declined, arguing that the troops had to 
leave the border. 
4. February 2008-the UN pulled out its 1700-strong peacekeeping force due
to lack of fuel supplies following the Eritrean government restrictions. 
5. April 2008-the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon warned of the
likelihood of a new war between Ethiopia and Eritrea if the peacekeeping 
mission withdrew completely. The options were oulined for the future of the 
UN mission in the two countries. 
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6. Djibouti accused the Eritrean troops of digging trenches at the disputed
Ras Doumeira border area and infiltrating Djiboutian territory. Eritrea denied 
the charge. 
7. May 2008-Eritrea called on the UN to terminate the peacekeeping mission.
8. June 2008-Fighting broke out between Eritrean and Djiboutian troops
(Eritrea Profile:    A Chronology of key Events, 2012). 
Conclusion  
This paper has endeavoured to survey the subject of conflict in such a way as to 
demonstrate briefly how complex and multi-layered it can be. Treating the Eritrean-
Ethiopian dispute as a mere border conflict understimates the consequences, this 
conflict is having on not only the international stability of both states and the entire 
region, but also on the continent as a whole. Coupled with the already heavy loss of life 
it has entailed, the conflict has also diverted scarce human and material resources much 
needed for social and economic development, to war instead. Each nation spends 
considerably on purchasing military hardware that their poor economies can hardly 
afford, and on destabilizing the other.  
As evidently seen, this conflict has wider implications and, if left unresolved, it has the 
potential of further escalation and spreading while drawing in forces from afar and near. 
Left to its own logic, the conflict can also lead to possible failure-even cpllapse-of the 
states. Yet, to begin with, the dispute should never have been treated as a mere border 
issue. Therefore, its resolution is best sought within its wider context and for the sake of 
lasting peace and stability. Also, the internal conflicts in both states need to be 
addressed. The international community should, as such, look at the wider aspects of the 
conflict, both internal and regional, and help in finding a comprehensive solution to 
relations between the two countries.  
The Algers Agreement has stalled and is no longer the solution that it was thought to be. 
Furthermore, it must have been clearly recognised by all that the agreement and the 
subsequent decisions based on it were the wrong instruments for solving the conflict 
between the two states. Therefore, it is pertinent to look at the problem differently and 
find appropriate mechanisms that ensure a lasting solution for both states and peoples. 
As the real victims of the conflict, the citizens of both nations should be the 
beneficiaries of such a resolution and be involved in defining and managing the 
relations between them.    
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